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I. INTRODUCTION
The tax treatment of covenants not to compete sold in conjunction
with goodwill is an area of tax law fraught with uncertainty and con-
fusion. This article will attempt to critically examine current judicial ap-
proaches and to explore and analyze the critical issue involved-the
nature and function of a covenant not to compete and its relationship to
goodwill. Upon completion of this analysis, an alternative method of tax
treatment will be suggested.
When a covenant to refrain from competition is given in association
with the sale of a business, either in sole proprietorship, partnership, or
corporate form, the excess of the purchase price over the value of the
tangible assets must be attributed either to the covenant or to some other
intangible asset, usually goodwill. This attribution is of paramount con-
cern to the tax status of vendor and vendee because the amount allocated
to the covenant produces ordinary income for the covenantor-vendor and
an amortization deduction for the covenantee-vendee, and the amount
allocated to goodwill secures capital-gain treatment for the seller but no
deduction for the buyer.
At present, the courts have dealt with agreements not to compete
associated with the sale of a business in three ways: (1) by applying the
* Member of the New York Bar.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
'severability' theory, (2) by applying the test employed in Wilson Ath-
letic Goods Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,1 and (3) by applying the test
employed in Carl Danielson v. Commissioner.2 For tax purposes there are
three classes of covenants: 1) the "naked covenant," an agreement not
to compete unaccompanied by the sale of a going business; 2) the "third
party covenant," an agreement not to compete accompanied by a transfer
of a going business, where the covenantor is not the one whose business
is being transferred; and 3) a "seller's covenant," an agreement given
by the operator of a going business in conjunction with the sale of assets
and goodwill.
II. THE SEVERABILITY THEORY
The severability theory (sometimes referred to as the "strong proof
rule") which originated in Toledo Newspaper Co.,' is by far the most
prevalent approach to be found in the current opinions of the courts.
Its content and rationale are exemplified by the language of the court
in David H. Ullman.4 The second circuit, in affirming the Tax Court,
stated that
It is well established that the amount a purchaser pays to a
seller for a covenant not to compete in connection with the sale
of a business is ordinary income to the covenantor and an amor-
tizable item for the covenantee unless the covenant is so closely
related to a sale of goodwill that it fails to have any independent
significance apart from merely assuring the effective transfer of
the goodwill .... I
The burden of proof in the Tax Court is on the taxpayer, and
when the parties to a transaction . . . have specifically set out
the covenants in the contract and have there given them an as-
signed value, strong proof must be adduced by them in order to
overcome that declaration. The tax avoidance desires of the
buyer and seller in such a situation are ordinarily antithetical,
forcing them, in most cases, to agree upon a treatment which
reflects the parties' true intent with reference to the covenants,
and the true value of them in money.'
In Ullman, petitioners (sellers of the covenant) sold their stock in a
laundry and linen supply business to a corporation and promised, for
a fixed sum bargained for by the parties, not to compete. The court,
applying the severability test, held that since the covenants were bar-
gained for separately, and the taxpayers failed to prove that the cov-
1. 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 845 (1954), rev'd and rem'd, 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955).
2. 44 T.C. 549 (1965), vacated and rem'd, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 858 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Danielson).
3. 2 T.C. 794 (1943).
4, 29 TC. 129 (1957), aff'd, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959).
5. 264 F.2d at 308.
6. Id.
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enants had no independent significance apart from the goodwill, the
covenants were severable from the goodwill transferred and the con-
sideration received for the covenants was taxable as ordinary income
rather than as capital gain.7 In Aaron Mickaelss the parties failed to
allocate a value to a covenant not to compete or to goodwill. The Tax
Court held that where the covenant has not been dealt with as a separate
item (as here) and
accompanies the transfer of good will in the sale of a going
business and it is apparent that the covenant not to compete
has the function primarily of assuring to the purchaser the bene-
ficial enjoyment of the good will which he has acquired, the cov-
enant is regarded as nonseverable and as being in effect a con-
tributing element to the assets transferred.9
Obviously, in the case of the execution of a naked covenant unac-
companied by the transfer of goodwill or any other asset, the covenant
is a separate item and a fortiori "severable." It thus produces ordinary
income to the seller and an amortization deduction to the buyer.10 A
generally recognized principle that evolved from early common law,
however, holds that any covenant which suppresses competition by the
covenantor, and which is not ancillary to a lawful contract and necessary
to the protection of the covenantee, is void and unenforceable because
it tends to create a monopoly or to unreasonably restrain trade, contrary
to public policy." To permit an amortization deduction of the payment
for an illegal covenant to the buyer presupposes that his payments for
the covenant are an ordinary and necessary business expense,' 2 yet many
decisions have held that where an otherwise deductible payment is not
itself illegal under state law but is contrary to public policy, its deduction
is disallowed.' 8 Payments to secure an illegal covenant seem a fortiori
contrary to public policy and therefore not deductible; however, this
issue has apparently never been raised in tax cases.' 4
In the case of "sellers" and "third party" covenants, the courts,
in applying the "severability" test, look primarily at whether the parties
bargain over the covenant and allocate a part of the sale proceeds to it' 5
7. Id. The court said that "[pletitioners [taxpayers] were not in any real sense con-
nected with that good will since they had little, if any, contact with customers."
8. 12 T.C. 17 (1949).
9. Id. at 19.
10. News Leader Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1212 (1930), acquiesced in, IX-2
Cum. BuL_. 44 (1930). See Taylor, Covenants Not to Compete Consulting Arrangements,
Adjustments to Purchase Price, N.Y.U. 12TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1047 (1954).
11. 36 Am. Jua. Monopolies § 50 (1941) ; United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (1899).
12. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a).
13. S. SuRREY & W. WARREN, FEDERAL IxcoME TAXATION 246 (1961). See Harden Mort.
Loan Co. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 282 (10th Cir. 1943).
14. See Taylor, note 10 supra at 1048.
15. See, e.g., Aaron Michaels, 12 T.C. 17 (1949).
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to determine if the covenant is severable from goodwill. A judicial gloss,
however, has been added to the well-settled rule. The courts will defer
only to a good faith allocation made by the parties, and in at least one
case a court has ignored an allocation based purely on tax reasons.
16
If the allocation of value to the covenant is the product of arm's-length
bargaining between the parties, the courts will generally not challenge it.
The courts will, however, disregard an allocation that is so unrealistic
as to constitute a sham, as for example where the agreement not to
compete is devoid of economic value. 7
A. Critique of the "Severability" Theory
The "severability" test has been severely criticized as illogical,
evidentially narrow, and inconsistent in its application by the courts.
The ratio decidendi in the cases applying the test is that since the buyer's
and seller's tax motives are antithetical, 8 it is reasonable to assume
that the parties would allocate a value to the covenant not to compete
that is in accord with economic reality.
This approach obtains in other areas of the tax law, e.g., the tax
treatment of payments for goodwill by a partnership to a retiring or
deceased partner's estate. Under Section 736(b) of the Code,' 9 payments
made by a partnership in liquidation of the interest of a retiring or
deceased partner are considered incurred to purchase the former partner's
interest in the assets; or under Section 736(a), ° the payments are treated
either as the former partner's distributive share of the partnership in-
16. See Harold J. Burke, 18 T.C. 77 (1952), where the parties made no allocation
except as an apparent tax consequence afterthought. In George H. Payne, 22 T.C. 526
(1954), no separate consideration for the covenant was discussed in the negotiations or
delineated in the orginal sales contract. The Tax Court held that the covenant was ancillary,
and it disallowed amortization even though a value was ascribed to it in an amended
contract on the ground that such modification was an afterthought for the tax convenience
of the purchasers. Accord, Harry Shwartz, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1419 (1960); Dauksch
v. Busey, 125 F. Supp. 130 (D.C. Ohio 1954).
17. See Barnet, Covenants Not to Compete: Their Effects Upon the Covenantor and
Covenantee, N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 861, 865-68 (1960); Maddrea, Both Buyer and
Seller Face Traps in Covenants Not to Compete, 6 J. oF TAx. 86, 87 (1957). For example,
in Lee Ruwitch, 22 T.C. 1053 (1954), petitioner-lessor sold the lease and building in a shop-
ping center located in Los Angeles and agreed not to compete for $22,000. Both parties
knew that the seller was planning to leave for Florida and had only this one experience
in building houses. The court stressing these facts held that the consideration paid was for
the lease, not the covenant, and was taxable as capital gains. In Andrew A. Monaghan,
40 T.C. 680 (1963), the court, in determining whether the covenant had a separate value,
pointed not only to the fact that the final contract of sale did not contain the allocation of
value to covenant, but also to the fact that the covenantor-seller was ill, tired, and had no
intention of competing. Accord, Radio Medford, Inc. v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 641
(D.C. Ore. 1957).
18. If the covenant is deemed severable from goodwill, the consideration paid for it
produces ordinary income for the covenantor and may be amortized over its useful life
by the buyer-covenantee; if the covenant is not severable from goodwill, the consideration
paid for it produces capital gain and it is not amortizable by the buyer.
19. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 736(b).
20. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 736(a).
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come21 or as a "guaranteed payment. 22 If 736(b) applies, the payments
may result in capital gain or loss to the retiring partner,23 and are not
deductible by the partnership composed of the remaining partners.24
If 736(a)(1) applies, the payments will continue to have the same in-
come character in the hands of the former partner as the partnership
income out of which such payments are made2" and are not includible
in the remaining partners' distributive share of partnership income.26
If 736(a)(2) applies, the payments treated as "guaranteed" will be
ordinary income to the former partner 27 and result in a deduction to the
partnership.28 Payments for the former partner's goodwill will be treated
as a 736(b) payment if the partnership agreement so provides; other-
wise, the payments for goodwill will be treated as part of the distri-
butive share of income or as a guaranteed payment.29 Any "reasonable"
allocation or nonallocation to goodwill in an arms-length transaction
by the parties will be regarded as correct and not disturbed, ° apparently
because of the conflicting tax motives of the withdrawing and remaining
partners.3 1
This reliance on the allocations of taxpayers with conflicting tax
interests in order to measure the economic value of a covenant not to
compete or the goodwill of a former partner seems unsound. It unreal-
istically assumes equal tax knowledge and bargaining power between
the parties. In the case of covenants not to compete, the courts applying
the severability rule also rely on such allocations to resolve the more
crucial issue of whether the sale of a covenant not to compete in con-
junction with goodwill should be treated as a capital or ordinary income
transaction. In resolving this issue, the fundamental inquiry, in this
writer's view, should be directed at the nature and function of a cov-
enant not to compete and its relationship to goodwill.3 2 Consequently,
a formalistic test that merely looks at how the parties treat a covenant
not to compete in their contract of sale is not responsive.3 3 The fact that
parties bargain over a covenant does not relate to the function or eco-
nomic nature of the covenant, which is to protect goodwill. Perhaps
21. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 736(a) (1).
22. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 736(a) (2).
23. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 731(a), 732(a).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a) (2) (1956).
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 702.
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(4) (1956).
27. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 707(c).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(a)(4) (1956).
29. INT. RiEv. CODE OF 1954, § 736(b)(2)(B).
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.736-1(b)(3) (1956).
31. V. Zay Smith, 37 T.C. 1033 (1962), aff'd, 313 F.2d 16 (10th Cir. 1963); contra,
Joseph V. Meister, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 576 (1960), aff'd, 302 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1962).
32. See discussion at pp. 16-23 infra.
33. It is quite conceivable, for example, that a seller of a highly personalized business
(so that there is a strong goodwill element) has no intention of competing (so that the
income element is weak), yet he bargains over and agrees to a separate consideration for
the covenant.
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the formulators of the severability theory did examine the nature or
function of a covenant not to compete and concluded that the considera-
tion paid for such a covenant is theoretically ordinary income, but
that it cannot be segregated as a practical matter from the proceeds re-
ceived for the remainder of the business when the parties fail to make
an allocation between the covenant and goodwill. Even if this was the
rationale for the theory, it was never expressed in any of the cases
except possibly Rainier Brewing Co. 4
Under contract law a covenant is enforceable only if executed for
the purpose of protecting the goodwill that is transferred. 5 Under the
severability test, however, the two-fold result is that only covenants,
which may be unenforceable as contrary to the spirit of free trade are
accorded separate tax treatment, and those persons who induce or
demand such "tainted" promises reap both the nontax benefit of restraint
of trade and the tax benefit of an amortization deduction. 6
In addition, the fact that often the courts have not disturbed the
somewhat unrealistic allocations by parties has enabled those parties
receiving a modicum of tax advice to manipulate an allocation which is
to their net tax advantage, and which may bear no relationship to the
economic reality of the situation.3 7 For example, a seller-covenantor in
a low-income bracket could arrange with a purchaser-covenantee who
anticipates high business income to apportion a high figure to the cov-
enant. The tax savings to the buyer in the form of a high amortization
deduction could offset the tax loss to the seller, especially if the seller
were to avoid bunching his income by having the payments for the cov-
enant received in installments. 8 An adjustment of the purchase price
could then be made by the purchaser so that the seller could share
the tax benefits. To avoid treatment of the transaction as a sham)3 9
the parties could make an allocation when negotiations begin and have
the periodic payments conditoned upon compliance with the covenants.40
The strongest objection to the "severability" approach has been the
uncertainty in the law created by the courts' confused and inconsistent
application of the test.4' Most courts applying the severability test have
34. 7 T.C. 162, 180 (1946), aff'd, 165 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1948).
35. A. CoRBI, Contracts § 1387 (1960); 38 C.J.S. Goodwill § 13 (1943).
36. See discussion at p. 3 supra.
37. See United Finance & Thrift Corp. of Tulsa, 31 T.C. 278 (1958), aff'd, 282 F.2d
919 (4th Cir. 1960); Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust, 19 T.C. 718 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d
761 (10th Cir. 1954); Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir.
1954). But if the allocation is so unrealistic as to constitute a sham, the courts will chal-
lenge it. See p. 4 supra.
38. When a seller is paid a lump sum for the covenant, he is taxed on the entire amount
in the year of receipt whether on the cash or accrual method, under the claim of right
doctrine.
39. See Harold Burke, 18 T.C. 77 (1952) ; see note 16 supra.
40. This method was effective in Carboloy Co., 2 T.C. 1267 (1943).
41. See Taylor, note 10 supra at 1062; Queenan, Taxation of Covenants Not to Com-
pete in the Sale of a Business, 4 B.C. IiD. & Comm. L. REv. 267, 280, 284 (1963).
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respected the parties' allocation or lack of allocation of value to a cov-
enant if made in good faith and in arm's-length negotiations, and absent
strong proof to vitiate such allocation. There have, however, been cases
where the parties, in good faith, realistically treated the covenant in a
separate and severable manner, yet their allocation was denied. In Sidney
Alper,4 the sellers of a luncheonette executed a covenant not to compete,
which the contract recited to be in consideration of $42,235. The evi-
dence, accepted by the court, conclusively pointed to the fact that the
buyer would not have bought the business without the covenant. Never-
theless, the court applied the severability test and concluded that the
covenant was incident to the goodwill.43 Similarly, Toledo Newspaper
Co." held that despite a specified consideration for the covenant, the
taxpayer corporation accrued only capital gain because the covenant was
"unnecessary in order to prevent the seller from destroying the value of
the goodwill... transferred. '4 The case of Toledo Blade Co.,48 following
Toledo Newspaper Co., held that the 'buyer incorrectly amortized the
covenant, which was indivisible from the goodwill.
Sometimes the courts have disregarded a good faith, arm's-length
allocation by the parties and have substituted one of its own. In Max
Levine,4" a taxpayer sold his fuel oil business and, at the behest of the
buyer and with the approval of his tax accountant, agreed to an allocation
of $35,000 in the sales agreement to a covenant acknowledged to be very
valuable by the Tax Court. The Third Circuit, espousing the severability
test, affirmed the Tax Court's reallocation of 50 percent ($17,500) to
goodwill and 50 percent to the covenant.48
Under the "severability" theory, if buyer and seller fail to allocate
part of the consideration paid to a covenant not to compete, the covenant
is deemed inseverable from the goodwill absent strong proof to the con-
trary. Nevertheless, frequently under these circumstances courts have
held the covenant to be severable. In both Rodney B. Horton49 and Mel-
von C. Miller,50 the courts, after acknowledging the presence of goodwill
42. 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1156, 1157 (1956).
43. There was no mention of the seller-shareholder lacking a direct proprietary interest
in the transferred assets. This may have influenced the court; see discussion at p. 000, infra.
44. 2 T.C. 794 (1943).
45. Id. at 802. The Court was influenced by the fact that the seller possessed a direct
proprietary interest. See the discussion at p. 8 infra. The Court also viewed as a whole
the consideration paid for both tangible and intangible assets. Williams v. McGowan, 152
F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945), was not yet the law.
46. 180 F.2d 357 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 811 (1950).
47. 324 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1963), aff'g, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 410 (1962).
48. Id. See Fox & Hounds, Inc., 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1344 (1962), where the court
disregarded the parties' allocation of consideration to a bargained-for covenant and at-
tributed the consideration to goodwill, though goodwill did not appear as an asset in any
of the balance sheets, records, or even as an item in the sales contract; and Joseph Faulkner,
25 P-H Tax. Ct. Mem. 154 (1956), where the Tax Court found a separately bargained-for
covenant to be inseverable from goodwill.
49. 13 T.C. 143 (1949), Commissioner's appeal dismissed, 180 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1950).
50. 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 2079 (1964).
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
among the assets transferred, arbitrarily assigned equal amounts of con-
sideration to both the covenant and goodwill,51 even though the parties
failed to make an allocation. Pursuant to a contract, the taxpayer-pur-
chaser in Williamson & Waite, Inc. v. United States52 acquired the name-
goodwill, customer list, rights to renewal premiums, and office equipment
of an insurance agency, along with a covenant not to compete, for a total
unallocated consideration of $25,000. The district court held that the
covenant was worth $18,750 and could be amortized by the buyer. In
Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co.,53 the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax
Court and held that the purchaser could amortize a covenant even though
it was not given a specific value in the purchase agreement. The court
cited Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust 4 (which rigidly followed the sever-
ability theory), but stated that "it is immaterial whether the contract did
or did not define a specified amount as the value of the covenant." 5
For an allocation of the parties to be respected by the courts it
should bear some semblance of reality, yet some courts applying the
"severability" rule have accepted highly unrealistic apportionments. In
Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust,"' the Gazette Telephone Company pub-
lished a newspaper in which the taxpayer owned stock. A prospective
purchaser stated in a letter to taxpayers that he wanted part of the
purchase price of the stock to be in the form of a covenant not to compete
so that the new corporation could get an amortization deduction. The tax-
payers accepted the purchaser's allocation of $150 per share for the stock
and $50 per share for the covenant with very little discussion, on the
premise that the allocation would make no difference to them. The court
rejected the argument that the entire sum was in reality paid for the
stock, and held that the covenant produced ordinary income, stating that
even if there was little discussion on the allocation it was enough for tax
purposes that the parties understood the contract and entered into it."
In Gazette Tel. Co.58 the buyer was permitted to amortize the covenant.
Another area of confusion associated with the severability test is
the inconsistent judicial treatment of "third party covenants." Some
courts hold that if the covenantor has no direct proprietary interest in
51. Justice Black in Horton may have been influenced by the fact that a contract
provision reduced percentage payments 50 percent in the event that the seller-convenantor
were to die or cease to be a resident of the State; however, no mention of this provision
is made in the opinion.
52. 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. [ 9163 (D.C. Ind. 1961).
53. 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'g & rem'g, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1954).
54. 19 T.C. 718 (1953), aff'd 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
.55. 222 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1955). See also Christensen Machine Co. v. United States,
50 F.2d 282 (Ct. Cl. 1931).
56. 19 T.C. 718 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954). See also the companion
case of Gazette Tel. Co., 19 T.C. 692 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1954).
57. 19 T.C. at 725. The court seemed to ignore the petitioners' evidence bearing on the
value of the covenant, which petitioners contended was zero because none of them intended
to engage further in the newspaper business and there was doubt about the legal capacity of
the Hamlin Trust and El Pomar Investment Co. to do so.
58. 19 T.C. 692 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1945).
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the goodwill being sold (as when a shareholder, officer, or employee exe-
cutes a covenant in conjunction with the sale of corporate goodwill), then
the covenant is incapable of co-existing with goodwill and maintains its
independent nature; thus its sale always produces ordinary income for
the covenantor. 9 Other courts regard this distinction as unsound. 60 The
latter view seems more logical; whether a covenantor sells stock (share-
holder) or assets (proprietor), his promise is primarily of value in pro-
tecting the goodwill sold. The differences arising from the status of the
covenantor are differences not in the purpose or function of the covenant
but in the particular circumstance in which its value is ascertained. 61
A final inconsistency in the judicial application of the "severability"
theory is the treatment accorded a transaction involving a covenant when
there exists a disparity in the tax knowledge of the parties. In Clarence
Clark Hamlin Trust62 the purchaser prevailed upon the seller to assign
a high value to a covenant to help them taxwise. The sellers agreed be-
cause they thought the allocation was of no consequence, and the court
upheld the allocation. However, in John W. Shleppey,63 a purchaser in-
duced a tax-ignorant seller to consent to a high apportionment of value to
a covenant and the Tax Court ignored it.
B. Substance Versus Form
One may ponder why the severability theory has been so shrouded
with confusion and why courts have taken such divergent paths in apply-
ing it. The explanation may be the problem of substance versus form, a
problem certainly not new to the tax law. It has cropped up in virtually
every area of tax law: e.g., sales to establish losses; transactions between
controlling shareholders and corporations; corporate reorganizations and
the "business purpose" test; the distinguishing of rents and royalties from
sales; the recognition or non-recognition of the corporate entity; and
transactions producing constructive income.64 Numerous Supreme Court
decisions have enunciated the principle that substance will prevail over
form.
Questions of taxation must be determined by viewing what was
actually done, rather than the declared purpose of the partic-
ipants; and when applying the provisions of the Sixteenth
Amendment and income tax laws enacted thereunder, we must
regard matters of substance and not mere form.65
59. See David H. Ullman, 29 T.C. 129 (1957), aff'd, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959);
Pickering & Co., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 515 (1964) (appeal dismissed).
60. See Sidney Alper, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1156 (1956); George Payne, 22 T.C. 526
(1954).
61. Note, Tax Treatment of Covenants Not to Compete: A Problem of Purchase
Price Allocation, 67 YALE L.J. 1260, 1265 (1958).
62. 19 T.C. 718 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1954).
63. 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 897 (1963).
64. See cases collected in 5 Am. FED. TAx. SERV. f T 41,000-20 (1967).
65. Weiss v. Steam, 265 U.S. 242 (1924); see Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935).
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Furthermore, the Court specifically related the principle to the issue of
capital gain versus ordinary income discussed in Corn Products Refining
Co. 66
A formalistic approach to problems, however, often contributes
simplicity, consistency, and objectivity to the judicial decision-making
process, especially in relation to substance versus form. Under the sev-
arability doctrine, substance is a complex of many factors (allocation of
parties, status of covenantor, covenantor's ability and desire to compete,
mode of payments, tax knowledge of parties, etc.). Consequently, some
judges who are oriented to "substance" have held that treating the allo-
cation of the parties as the primary factor is evidentially narrow;," that
the proprietary status of the covenantor is irrelevant;6" that the assign-
ment of value to the covenant must be realistic;69 that the tax knowledge
of the parties is relevant;"0 and that the capacity and intent of the cov-
enantor is relevant.71 Other judges, who are oriented to "form," have held
that the way in which the covenant is treated in the sales agreement is
of paramount importance;72 that the tax knowledge of the parties is
irrelevant; 7 and that the proprietary status of the covenantor is rel-
evant. 4 As an outgrowth of this tension between "substance" and "form,"
two courts diametrically opposed in views, the Seventh Circuit in Wilson
Athletic Goods Mfg. Co.75 (substance) and the Third Circuit in Carl
Danielson76 (form) have formulated a new test to determine the tax con-
sequences of selling a covenant not to compete in association with good-
will, under the guise of applying the "severability" theory.
1. WILSON TEST (SUBSTANCE OVER FORM)
In Wilson, the taxpayer had for many years been engaged in pur-
chasing athletic shoes from various companies and selling them under
the "Wilson" label. Taxpayer company then purchased a shoe manufac-
turing concern to eliminate its reliance on outside suppliers, and insisted
on having a covenant included in the purchase agreement. The Wilson
Company had its own means and methods of distribution, its own cus-
tomer lists, and its own brand names, so that it was not as interested in
purchasing goodwill as it was in obtaining a noncompetition agreement;
66. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
67. See Barnet, note 17 supra at 873.
68. See e.g., George Payne, 22 T.C. 526 (1954).
69. See e.g., Joseph Meister, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 576 (1960), aff'd, 302 F.2d 54 (2d
Cir. 1962).
70. See e.g., John W. Shleppey, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 897 (1963).
71. See e.g., Lee Ruwitch, 22 T.C. 1053 (1954).
72. See e.g., Pickering & Co., 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 515 (1964) (appeal dismissed).
73. See e.g., Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust, 19 T.C. 718 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 761
(10th Cir. 1954).
74. See e.g., David H. Ullman, 29 T.C. 129 (1957), aff'd, 264 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1959).
75. 222 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'g & rem'g, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1954).
76. 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'g & rem'g 44 Tax Ct. 549 (1965), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 858 (1967).
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however, the parties failed to allocate a value to the covenant in the con-
tract. The Tax Court, applying the "severability" rule, held the covenant
to be severable from goodwill. The Seventh Circuit reversed and re-
manded:
But in tax matters we are not bound by the strict terms of the
agreement; we must examine the circumstances to determine
the actualities and may sustain or disregard the effect of a writ-
ten provision or of an omission of a provision, if to do so best
serves the purpose of the tax statute . . . .The incidence of
taxation depends upon the substance of the transaction ....
Consequently, it is immaterial whether the contract did or did
not define a specified amount as the value of the covenant."
The Wilson approach has been followed by the Ninth Circuit in Anna-
belle Candy Co.,7s and by the Tax Court in occasional memorandum
decisions. 71
The severability test has often been criticized for giving too much
weight to a single evidentiary factor-the presence or absence of an allo-
cation of value to a covenant. The Wilson approach certainly is as refined
and broad, in an evidentiary sense, as the "severability" approach is
crude and narrow, and even if one concludes that a covenant should al-
ways be treated as capital in nature or always as "ordinary income" in
nature there will always be that hard case not amenable to the general
rule. This would be the situation in which the case-by-case Wilson ap-
proach would be most responsive.
It would appear that a logical extension of the "substance over form"
view would be for a court not only to accept or reject an allocation of the
parties, looking to the substance of the transaction (as was done in Wil-
son), but also to reallocate where all the facts and circumstances indicate
that both the covenant and goodwill have value. 0 One might argue that
such reallocation involves the courts in complicated questions of val-
uation which they can only resolve by making arbitrary allocations be-
tween covenants not to compete and goodwill.81 Yet the supporters of the
77. 222 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1955), rev'g & rem'g, 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1954).
It is interesting to note that the court cites Hamlin, which rigidly followed the severa-
bility rule.
78. 314 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1962), aff'g, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 953 (1961).
79. John T. Fletcher, 34 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1633 (1965). See also George H. Wilcox,
37 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 771 (1968); Harry Shwartz, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1419 (1960).
80. The "Cohan rule" [Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930)] has been
used by the Commissioner to arrive at a fair approximation of allowable deductions absent
sufficient evidence to support exact allowances. The rule has been applied by the Tax Court
to reallocate between covenants not to compete and goodwill; e.g., Max Levine, 31 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. 410 (1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 298 (3d Cir. 1963) (50-50 allocation); James
M. Herndon, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1115 (1962).
81. In Max Levine, 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 410 (1962), aff'd, 324 F.2d 298 (3d Cir.
1963), and Melvon C. Miller, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 2079 (1964), the Tax Court con-
veniently allocated one-half to the covenant and one-half to goodwill.
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Cohan-Wilson approach8 2 would argue, as did Judge Murdock in Toledo
Blade Co., that "[t] he one sure way to do injustice in such cases is to
allow nothing whatever upon the excuse that we cannot tell how much to
allow."18 3 Furthermore, the proponents of the Cohan-Wilson approach
might point to the Williams v. McGowan rule requiring the sale of a
going concern to be comminuted into its fragments, with the fragments to
be separately matched against the definition in sections 1117, 1221 and
1231.84 The argument would be that since Williams v. McGowan the Com-
missioner and the courts have become involved in the valuation of capital,
both ordinary and section 1231 assets, especially where the buyer and
seller have failed to set forth an allocation in their agreement. However,
those opposing the Wilson view would contend that a situation involving
a covenant is not one where the directive of the Williams v. McGowan
case applies, because the more important question involved is not the
price or market value of the covenant but whether the covenant should
be treated as a capital or ordinary asset.8 5 To determine what portion of
the selling price is to be allocated to a particular asset one may look at
objective and easily ascertainable criteria of value8 6 such as market
value, book value, cost, and at how the parties treated the particular
item in their sales agreement. To determine tax consequences of the sale
of a covenant with good will, however, one applying the Wilson test would
also be compelled to examine more amorphous factors, such as the nature
and function of the particular covenant and the circumstances of its
creation.
The strongest objection to the Wilson approach would appear to be
that the Commissioner and courts would, in each case, be required to
examine a profusion of intangible factors to reach an allocation decision,
and as a consequence, increased revenues may be outweighed by in-
creased investigatory expenses; the conquest of substance over form may
be outweighed by needless uncertainty and a disruption of honest tax
planning.
2. CARL DANIELSON TEST (FORM OVER SUBSTANCE)
At the other end of the "substance versus form" spectrum is Carl
Danielson,87 where taxpayers who were shareholders in a small loan busi-
ness agreed to sell their stock to Thrift Investment Corporation (herein-
82. See e.g., Grogan, Planning for the "Excess" Cost of a Purchased Business; Allocation
Problems, 19 J. oF TAX. 332, 334 (1963).
83. 11 T.C. 1079, 1087 (1948) (dissenting opinion), quoting Commissioner v. Maresi,
156 F.2d 929, 931 (2d Cir. 1946) (opinion of Handin, J.).
84. 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945).
85. Note, Considerations in Applying the Rule of Williams v. McGowan, 13 TAX. L.
REv. 369, 381 (1958).
86. See Rev. Rul. 55-79, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 370
87. 44 T.C. 549 (1965), rev'd & rem'd, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 858 (1967).
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after called Thrift) for $374 per share and each shareholder agreed to
execute a covenant not to compete. The covenants were of little economic
value because the business was being run by a manager and none of the
taxpayers were acquainted with the small loan company business. Before
the closing, Thrift officials had unilaterally decided to allocate roughly
$152 of the purchase price per share to the covenant and the remaining
$222 to the stock. At the closing, they presented the covenants and sales
agreement, including the allocation, to the taxpayers for signature. When
the taxpayers questioned the unexpected and large amounts allocated to
the covenants, the Thrift officials explained that the allocations were to
Thrift's tax benefit but did not explain to the shareholders that these
amounts would be taxable to them as ordinary income. The taxpayers,
after a brief discussion, signed the documents on advice of counsel. The
Tax Court, applying the "severability" rule, held that the covenants were
not realistically bargained for by the parties, and that the taxpayers had
presented strong proof to overcome the contract allocation.88 Conse-
quently, the taxpayers were allowed to report the entire gain from the
sale of their shares as capital gain. In a closely divided opinion, the Third
Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that even if the sellers could
prove (and the Tax Court so found) that the allocation had no economic
reality or independent basis in fact, this proof would, in the absence of
fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence, be irrelevant. The court stated
"[W]e adopt the following rule of law: a party can challenge the tax
consequences of his agreement as construed by the Commissioner only by
adducing proof which in an action between the parties to the agreement
would be admissible to alter that construction or to show its unenforce-
ability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc."' 9 The
ratio decidendi of the decision is that, without such a rule, the parties to
contracts allocating a specific value for the covenant would be able uni-
laterally to reform the agreement to their benefit. Tax results in such
cases would no longer be predictable, and the Commissioner would be
hindered in collecting taxes because he would be required to meet the
parties' separate interpretations of their agreement.
The Danielson result, as dissenting Judge Staley points out, clearly
disregards repeated declarations by the Supreme Court that substance
should prevail over form." In addition, Danielson ignores what should
be the fundamental inquiry in evolving any test in this area-that is, the
nature and function of a covenant not to compete and its relationship to
good will.9 Merely determining the value of a covenant not to compete
88. 44 T.C. at 556. Cf. David H. Ullman, 29 T.C. 129 (1957), aff'd, 264 F.2d 305 (2d
Cir. 1959).
89. 378 F.2d at 775. A rule very similar to this was set forth in John Rogers v. U.S.,
4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5770 (D.C. Nev. 1959), aff'd, 290 F.2d 501 (9th Cir. 1961), where
the severability test was applied very rigidly.
90. 378 F.2d at 779-80.
91, See discussion at p. 16 et seq. infra.
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does not decide whether it should be treated, when sold, as a capital or
an ordinary income transaction.
Even if it is decided that a bargained-for covenant with a fixed con-
sideration ascribed to it in a contract produces ordinary income to the
seller and an amortization deduction for the buyer (as is generally pre-
sumed in the severability test), the Danielson approach is not too helpful
in determining the actual economic or business value of the covenant.
This is for the reason that it invites, to an even greater extent than the
"severability" test, tax manipulation by the parties .2
The language in the Danielson opinion suggests that an allocation
of value in a contract between a covenant and good will should, as a
matter of tax law, be no less binding on the parties than is, as a matter
of contract law, the setting of the purchase price. In a contract of sale,
courts respect and enforce the value (selling price) of that which is sold,
as determined by the parties in their agreement. This may be due to the
fact that when two parties bargain over sales price their conflicting in-
terests will assure a figure that is reasonably fair to both; however, even
if the agreed upon price is outlandish, the courts will generally enforce
the terms of the contract absent fraud or mistake because of the reliance
upon these terms by the promisee." However, the contract situation is
not wholly analogous to the situation involving a covenantor and cov-
enantee who allocate a value to the covenant in a sales agreement. It
is true that if the parties allocate a value to the covenant, the covenantee
relies upon such allocation for an amortization deduction; and similarly,
if the parties fail to allocate, the covenantor relies upon the absence of
an allocation for capital gain treatment. Indeed, at least one court has
indicated that if one party subsequently denies the allocation or nonallo-
cation for tax reasons and thus deprives the other party of his anticipated
favorable tax treatment, this may be treated as a breach of contract. 4
The situation involving covenantor and covenantee making an allo-
cation, however, is unlike the contract situation in that a third party is
involved-the Commissioner, who represents the public interest in tax
revenues. In a contract, the interests of the buyer and seller are anti-
thetical (buyer wants a low purchase price and seller wants a high one);
but a covenantor and covenantee, with some tax advice, can resolve their
tax conflict9 5 and thus adversely affect the interest of the public in max-
imizing its revenues. The majority in Danielson should, it seems, be more
concerned about this danger to public resources than the alleged danger
to revenues resulting from the parties espousing inconsistent interpreta-
tions on the meaning of their contract. The argument of the majority,
that to permit one party to refute the allocation "would be in effect to
92. See discussion at p. 5 supra.
93. See 1 CoRBin, CoNTAcTs §§ 126, 127 (1963).
94. Stern & Co. v. State Loan & Fin. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 702, 705-06 (D.C. Del. 1962).
95. See discussion at p. 5 supra.
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grant... a unilateral reformation of the contract with a resulting unjust
enrichment,"9 6 is not consonant with case-law principles on the doctrine
of unjust enrichment. 7 It is true that permitting the objecting party to
obtain a tax benefit by challenging the agreed upon allocation may be
detrimental to the other party whose tax position is more vulnerable to
an attack by the Commissioner. However, the alleged unjust enrichment
of the objecting party and concomitant damage to the other contracting
party is due not to the action of the objecting party but to the action of
the Commissioner, who is a third party and thus a stranger to the contract.
Even in a strict evidentiary sense, the Danielson rule seems unsound
and against the weight of precedent. The rule, substantially equivalent to
the parol evidence rule, prohibits the admission of parol and other ex-
trinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of the written contract.
"The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to carry out the presumed
intention of the parties who have put their contract in written form, thus
to achieve certainty and finality as to their rights and duties and to
exclude fraudulent and perjured claims. 98 The Tax Court, refusing to
follow Danielson in a recent decision, points out that one of the historic
reasons for the rule-protection for the party to the agreement who
changes his position in reliance upon its terms-is never present in a
contest between the taxing authority and one of the parties to the ques-
tioned agreement. 99 Moreover, under the rule, the dissent in the Danielson
case points out that it would be possible, in view of the difficult burden
of showing fraud, for "knowledgeable buyers [to] engage in question-
able and sharp deals to secure the advantages of such covenants, and the
majority's rule will shield their agreements."'" 0 This in fact did happen
in Danielson, but a reading of the cases has not shown that parties, with-
out such a rule, have been able unilaterally to reform their agreements
by attacking them in order to avoid unfavorable tax consequences.1 1 The
strange result is that the Danielson rule encourages deception, if not
outright fraud, which is the very evil it was designed to prevent.
Furthermore, notwithstanding a denial in the majority opinion, the
Danielson rule is clearly against the weight of precedent. The general rule
is that since substance rather than form is controlling in tax law, the
96. 378 F.2d at 775.
97. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937).
98. L. SImPSONq, CoNTRAcTs § 98 (2d ed. 1965). For comprehensive treatment of the
parol evidence rule, see 3 CoaaN', CoNTRAcTs §§ 573-96 (rev. ed. 1960).
99. J. Leonard Schmitz, 51 T.C. 214 (1968). In this case, unlike Danielson, the pro-
ceeding was consolidated so that both the buying and selling parties were before the court,
and the Commissioner, in the position of a "stockholder," merely asked that the inter-
pretation of the agreement be consistent as to each of the parties. However, the court
indicated it was not influenced by this fact in its holding that the Danielson rule did not
apply. Id. at 221, 222. It is interesting to note that thus far none of the other circuit courts
have ruled on the Danielson degree of proof rule.
100. 378 F.2d at 782.
101. See, e.g., Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust, 19 T.C.' 718 (1953), aff'd, 209 F.2d 761
(loth Cir. 1954).
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standard rules of evidence are restricted in application. The parol evi-
dence rule does not apply to transactions involving a third party,10 2 and
where the Commissioner was neither a party nor privy to a written instru-
ment a taxpayer may introduce evidence at variance with its terms in
order to show the real nature of the transaction. 0
3
Proponents of the Danielson rule0 4 suggest that the rule will ease
the administrative burden of the Commissioner in collecting taxes. The
new rule would eliminate the vagueness of the current standard and thus
discourage taxpayers from risking court action. It would also obviate the
need of the Commissioner to litigate one party's claim without certainty
that the result will be applied consistently to the other party, since the
statute of limitations may have run or the litigation may have arisen in
a different forum which can reach a different result on the same facts.'05
Moreover, the Danielson result would foster an increased predictability
of the tax consequences associated with the sale of a covenant not to
compete. However, both the advantages of eliminating difficulties for the
Commissioner in the collection of taxes and that of creating tax certainty
can be achieved by the adoption of a different hard-and-fast rule-to
always treat the proceeds from the sale of covenants as part of the pro-
ceeds from the sale of goodwill-which, as we shall see, is the rule most
responsive to the nature and function of a covenant and its relationship
to goodwill.' 0
III. NATURE AND FUNCTION OF COVENANT NOT TO COMPETE
AND GOODWILL
Having examined and criticized the present state of the law, focus
shall be on alternatives. The threshold question in deciding how the sale
of a covenant not to compete should be treated should be whether the
102. See cases collected in 5 AM. FED. TAX. SERV. ff 39,235 (1968).
103. See Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust, 19 T.C. 718, 724 (1953), in which the Tenth
Circuit affirmed this principle without discussion. Occasionally, in tax cases not involving
covenants, the Commissioner has been successful in preventing a taxpayer from using parol
evidence to contradict the terms of his own agreement in order to obtain a tax advantage.
See, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966). However, the courts have
generally proscribed invocation of the parol evidence rule by the Commissioner on the
ground (expressed in Clarence Clark Hamlin Trust) that the parol evidence rule cannot
be utilized by a third party (the Commissioner representing the United States, which is a
stranger to the contract). See, e.g., Haverty Realty & Investment Co., 3 T.C. 161, 167 n.2
(1944) (citing additional cases).
It is interesting to note that in Thomas Yandell v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 306
(D.C. Ore. 1962), aff'd, 315 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1963), the lower court, which was so
formalistic in its approach as to resemble Danielson, stated in dictum, "the above statutes
and rules [parol evidence and best evidence rules) of evidence would not prevent the plain-
tiff, (taxpayer in refund suit) where a third party is involved, such as here, [the Com-
missioner], from introducing evidence as to the true nature of the agreement." Id. at 308.
104. See, e.g., Comment, The Danielson Rule on the Tax Consequences of a Covenant
Not to Compete, 116 U. PA. L. Rv. 517, 524 (1968).
105. Brief for Appellant, Commissioner, at 12, Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d
771 (3d Cir. 1967).
106. See discussion at pp. 20-22 inira.
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sale of such a covenant in conjunction with goodwill ought to be viewed
as a capital or an ordinary income transaction. A capital gain or loss is
a gain or loss from the sale or exchange of a capital asset. All other gains
or losses are taxed at ordinary income rates. In deciding whether a dispo-
sition of property constitutes a capital gain or ordinary income trans-
action, the Supreme Court and the lower courts have not rigidly relied
upon the statutory definitions of Sections 1221 and 1232, nor have they
blindly relied upon the treatment accorded to a transaction by the parties
involved (contrary to what has resulted under the severability theory).
Rather, they have laid bare the economic substance and reality of a
particular transaction and probed the nature and function of the assets
involved."' 7 Therefore, before concluding with an alternative to the
"severability," Wilson and Danielson approaches,' it will first be neces-
sary to explore briefly the nature of goodwill and its relationship with
covenants not to compete, and the nature and function of such covenants.
A. Goodwill
An early English decision defined goodwill as nothing more than
the probability that the old customers would resort to the old place of
business. 09 This definition has been expanded to include any transferable
competitive advantage which attaches to a business. Goodwill has been
categorized as consumer goodwill, industrial goodwill (harmonious labor
relations), and financial goodwill (ability to obtain capital), and has been
segmented into customer attitudes, general reputation, customers lists,
prospective patronage, and symbols invoking customer response." 0 Good-
will has long been recognized for tax purposes as an intangible, nonde-
preciable (since it has an unascertainable useful life), capital asset."'
The usual method for valuing goodwill for tax purposes is to capitalize
the earnings of the business that are attributable to goodwill. This is done
by (1) determining the average annual net earnings of the business, (2)
determining the value of the tangible assets, (3) deducting from the total
net earnings the earnings attributable to the tangible property, and (4)
capitalizing the balance." 2
Goodwill is property, recognized as such and protected by the law.
Where the seller of a business and its goodwill improperly interferes with
the transferred goodwill, the purchaser may have an action for damages.
A suit also lies to enjoin further interference by the seller, the damage to
107. Corn Products Refining Co., 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Court Holding Co., 324 U.S.
331 (1945).
108. See discussion at pp. 10-13 supra.
109. Lord Eldon in Cruttwell v. Lye, 34 Eng. Rep. 129, 134 (Ch. 1810).
110. See Note, An Inquiry Into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 CoL. L. Rav. 660, 664-65
(1953).
111. Id. at 712.
112. J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 59.37 (1958); Rev. Rul. 59-60,
1959-1 Cum. BULL. 237, 241.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
the purchaser in such cases being usually regarded as irreparable and the
legal remedy as inadequate because the damages are difficult to prove
and because the injury is a constantly recurring one."' The fact that
damages are not easily ascertainable does not bar the buyer from bring-
ing suit, nor is it necessary that he first prove special pecuniary damages
or show an actual loss of customers who might in any event have dis-
continued their patronage." 4
A general rule of law is that where the seller of a business agrees not
to engage in the same business in the same place, the obvious intent of
the seller is to transfer the goodwill of the business."15 The courts have
also held that, where a contract for the sale of a complete business does
not include a covenant and even omits to mention goodwill, there is a
presumption that the intention of the parties was to sell the goodwill
with the other assets because goodwill cannot exist except in connection
with the business." 6 It would seem to follow, in view of the aforemen-
tioned expanding definition of goodwill, that even in the absence of an
express covenant not to compete, there is an implied promise not to com-
pete (for new as well as old customers) when someone sells his business.
However, the rule of law followed in most jurisdictions is that, absent an
express covenant, the sale of a business together with the goodwill thereof
does not import an agreement by the vendor not to engage in a competing
business in the same vicinity as long as there is nothing to injure the
good disposition of the public toward the old place of business, or to
impair any of the advantages which the purchaser had properly acquired
by the purchase of the goodwill of the old customer." 7 Yet a minority of
jurisdictions (following the "Massachusetts view") hold that one who
sells the goodwill of his business thereby precludes himself from com-
peting with the old business, even for new customers." 8
The majority view seems self-contradictory. In most instances it is
impossible for a vendor not to injure the goodwill sold if he competes
with the old business. In a narrow sense, goodwill ,does not include the
ability to attract future customers, so perhaps the majority rule is sound
in permitting the vendor to compete for new customers. The policy behind
the majority rule, as one commentator suggests," 9 is apparently that the
courts regard the right to compete to be too basic to be proscribed by
113. 38 C.J.S. Goodwill § 16 (1943).
114. Id.
115. 24 A.. JuR. Goodwill § 13 (1939). See, e.g., Mahlstedt v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 2d
562, 180 P.2d 777 (1947) ; Yost v. Patrick, 245 Ala. 275, 17 So.2d 240 (1944).
116. 24 AM. JuR. Goodwill § 13 (1939). See, e.g., Langberg v. Wagner, 101 N.J. Eq.
383, 139 A. 518 (1927).
117. 24 Am. JuR. Goodwill § 18 (1939); 38 C.J.S. Goodwill § 12 (1943). See, e.g.,
Knoedler v. Glaenzer, 55 F. 895 (2d Cir. 1893).
118. 24 A.m. Ju-. Goodwill § 18 (1939); 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 84 (1945). See, e.g.,
Martino v. Pontone, 270 Mass. 158, 170 N.E. 67 (1930).
119. Queenan, Taxation of Covenants Not to Compete in the Sale of a Business, 4
B.C. IND. & COm. L. REv. 267, 268 (1963).
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implication. Nevertheless, they have no difficulty in enforcing restrictive
covenants which limit competition for as many as ten years. The majority
rule seems to ignore the fact that a seller's subsequent competition could
be disastrous to the old business. By simply going into business again, the
seller often could retain many of his old customers without even actively
competing with the old business.
In summary, the general rule of law seems to be that a person who
sells a business impliedly covenants not to compete, at least for his old
customers, with the new owner of the business.
B. Covenant Not to Compete
Express covenants not to compete are enforceable only if adopted
for the purpose of protecting transferred goodwill. 2 ' They are not deemed
to be illegal restraints on trade when reasonably limited in time and in
geography, and are enforced by an action for damages or an injunction. 21
There seem to be three plausible ways to characterize a covenant not to
compete: (1) the covenant is in substance a part of goodwill; (2) the
execution of a covenant not to compete is merely incidental to, and should
be subsumed under, the transfer of goodwill; and (3) the covenant is a
promise of certain conduct (forbearance) supported by consideration
which, to the promisor, is nothing more than a lump sum substitute for
future ordinary income.
C. A Covenant Not to Compete is in Substance
Part of Goodwill
As previously noted, the concept of goodwill is an ever expanding
one. Anything that contributes to net earnings in excess of a fair return
on the net tangible assets is properly characterized as goodwill.1 2 If good-
will can include as one of its components symbols invoking customer
response, then a fortiori it can also include the prospect of non-compe-
tition from the former owner. This competitive advantage bears most
directly on the original definition of goodwill-the probability that old
customers will resort to the old place of business.
Opponents of this view would argue that goodwill has been histor-
ically treated as "property" and that only property can constitute a
capital asset as defined in Section 1221. They would contend that a cov-
enantor is receiving compensation for forbearing from competition and
that this payment should be classified as is any other payment for per-
sonal service, i.e., ordinary income. However, the mere fact that goodwil)
has been built up by personal service is no bar to its classification as a
capital asset. 2 This is true even when the advantage is sustained largely
120. 6 A. CORBIN, Contracts § 1387 (1960); 38 C.J.S. Goodwill § 13 (1943).
121. 17 C.J.S. Contracts §§ 241, 242 (1963).
122. See p. 000 supra.
123. Cf. Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963); Commis-
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by personal elements. 124 It must be added, however, that goodwill and a
covenant not to compete have traditionally been treated as separate
entities, and in none of the cases previously discussed, have the parties
to the transaction regarded the two as equivalent.
D. The Covenant as an Incident to the Transfer of Goodwill
That the execution of a covenant not to compete is merely incidental
to, and should be subsumed under, the transfer of goodwill seems to be
the most plausible of the three possibilities. If when a person sells a
business he impliedly covenants not to compete for his former customers,
then his express covenant not to compete seems to have little independent
significance apart from assuring, as an extra measure, the effective trans-
fer of the goodwill. It would appear that in tax law, just as in the law of
contracts, little if any significance should attach to a promise to do that
which one is already legally bound to do. Under this view the proceeds
from the sale of a covenant should be treated as inseverable from or part
of the proceeds received for the goodwill.
It is possible to imagine a transaction in which the pure elimination
of competition for future customers is an important element in the total
price paid for the covenant, but this is not the typical transaction. In
most instances the buyer wants the covenant only as an aid in obtaining
the goodwill of the seller. 2 5 One suspects that if the average businessman
were asked to express his opinion as to the purpose of a covenant not to
compete, he would probably say the purpose is not to get something new
(elimination of competition for future customers) but merely to protect
that which the purchaser already obtained from the seller-the seller's
goodwill with existing customers. A careful reading of the cases previously
discussed buttresses this belief: the language used in the covenant clauses,
as set forth in the sales agreements, reveals that none of the covenants
were more than incidentally concerned with the elimination of competi-
tion for future customers. 26
sioner v. Maurice L. Killian, 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1961), aff'd, 314 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1963).
124. Richard S. Wyler, 14 T.C. 1251 (1950).
125. Commentators supporting this view include Queenan, note 119 supra at 277, and
the author of Note, Tax Aspects of Goodwill and Covenants Not to Compete in the Transfer
of Partnership Interests, 16 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 449-51 (1963). MEaRTENS, note 112, supra
§ 22.33 at 219 writes that
[i]t is difficult to understand as a matter of economic reality how, in this kind of
a case, [covenant sold with goodwill] such a covenant can be anything except
"nonseverable" or "ancillary" regardless of whether or not the parties segregate or
deal with it as a separate item, since in either event the function of the covenant is
to protect the assets transferred and enters into the goodwill intangible.
126. A reading of the cases reveals a marked similarity in the language and substance
of those covenant clauses which detail the kinds of competition proscribed by the agreement.
Typical of such clauses is the one involved in Benjamin Levinson, 45 T.C. 380 (1966),
wherein the seller agreed, for a period of twelve years, not to
(a) [slolicit or accept any business from any [previous client] . . . . (b) [riequest
or advise any clients . . . to withdraw, curtail, or cancel his business . . . ,
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The execution of a covenant not to compete simultaneously with the
transfer of goodwill seems analogous to a transferor's performance of
"incidental services" in connection with the sale of property or in con-
nection with the simultaneous tax-free transfer of property for stock in
a section 351 exchange. 127 According to Rev. Rul. 64-56,128 "[w]here the
transferor agrees to perform services in connection with a transfer of
property, tax-free treatment will be accorded if the services were merely
ancillary and subsidiary to the property transfer . . . . Ancillary and
subsidiary services could be performed for example, in promoting the
transaction by demonstrating and explaining the -use of the property,
or by assisting in the effective 'starting-up' of the property transferred,
or by performing under a guarantee relating to such effective starting-
up .... ,,1211 However, training the transferee's employees in specialized
skills, continuing technical assistance after the starting-up phase, or
assistance in the construction of a building to house property transferred
will be regarded as furnishing services that are separate from and in
addition to the property transferred. For example, if a dealer in complex
IBM computers were to sell his business or transfer it to a "controlled"
corporation in exchange for section 351 stock, he might offer to explain
both the intricacies of the computer to new employees and to render con-
tinued technical assistance in conjunction with the transfer of the physical
assets. He might also offer to forego competition with the new owner and,
in addition, offer to stay on for six months to acquaint the owner with his
former customers, in conjunction with the transfer of his goodwill. Under
the Revenue Ruling his indoctrination of new employees would be ancil-
lary to the transfer of the computers, but his rendition of continued
technical advice would be a service, separate from the transfer of prop-
erty, thus disqualifying the exchange from tax-free treatment. If he sold
the business the indoctrination would be treated as ancillary to the trans-
fer of the computers, but a part of the sales proceeds would probably be
attributed to his consulting efforts and taxed as ordinary income. It is
reasonable to assume that advising new employees is necessary in order
to assure the transferee's beneficial enjoyment of the transferred tangible
assets, and that his continued technical assistance would add something
new to the bargain. Similarly, if the owner were to stay on for six months
he would be giving the buyer or transferee corporation more than was
bargained for, but if he were to promise not to compete he would be pro-
tecting the transferee's enjoyment of the transferred intangible asset-
(c) [i]nduce or influence any employee, salesman, distributor, or broker of the
company to terminate his relationship; (d) [elngage in [competing] business
... in the Staie of Washington, either as an employee, proprietor, partner or stock-
holder. Id. at 386.
127. Under INT. REV. ConE OF 1954, § 351, a transfer of property unaccompanied
by service and solely for stock in a corporation controlled by the transferor is a tax-free
exchange.
128. 1964-1 Cum. BuLL. 133.
129. Id. at 134.
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goodwill-and his promise would merely be a contributory element of
the transfer.30
This view on the nature and function of a covenant was hinted at in
an opinion by the Ninth Circuit in Ray 15. Schulz.'3' The court, affirming
the Tax Court's decision that payments for a covenant were really for
goodwill, did not flatly state that goodwill and a concomitant covenant
not to compete should never be afforded separate tax treatment; the
court did, however, express the view that
If there is a covenant which has a basis in economic reality, it
must contribute to goodwill....
If there is reason to believe that the business has prospered
because of the character or the reputation of the proprietor or
partner-the friendly bartender or the trusted stockbroker are
examples-this would tend to show that a genuine business
reason prompted the covenant. Such reputation or character
would also form a part of the goodwill. However, the question
is one of fact and not one of classification as "severable" or
"non-severable. , '18 2
E. The Covenant Not to Compete as A Lump-Sum
Substitute for Future Ordinary Income
Many commentators have argued along traditional lines that a cov-
enant not to compete cannot produce capital gain because it is not "prop-
erty" and thus not a capital asset within the definition of section 1221,
and because its disposition by the covenantor is not a "sale or ex-
change."'183 These definitional complexities are beyond the scope of this
paper; briefly, however, it may be argued that a covenant not to compete
represents to the covenantor a promise not to work for another or for one-
self and is no more a conveyance of "property" than is a promise to enter
the promisee's employ. According to this view, a covenant not to compete
is the renunciation of the seller's right to compete, which is akin to a
"naked contract" right to earn future ordinary income, and which lacks
the attributes of either an "equitable" interest or an estate in specific
property, either real or personal.'84 It may also be argued that the ex-
ecution of a covenant is not a sale or exchange but the extinguishment
of his right to compete.' 5' Unlike a true extinguishment, however, some-
130. See Heil Co., 38 T.C. 989 (1962), where the court found a sale of "know-how"
to be incident to a transfer of patents and thus entitled to capital-gain treatment.
131. 294 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1961), aff'g, 34 T.C. 235 (1960).
132. 294 F.2d at 56 (emphasis by the court).
133. See Taylor, note 10 supra at 1049; 67 YALE L.J., note 61 supra at 1266.
134. See Jose V. Ferrer, 35 T.C. 617 (1961), rev'd, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962). It
is interesting to note that the covenant, in the hand of the covenantee, does possess one
significant attribute of property under the Ferrer test-the covenantee may resort to injunc-
tive relief to protect his rights under the covenant.
135. See Galvin Hudson, 20 T.C. 734, 736 (1953), where the settlement of a judgment
purchased from another party was held to be an extinguishment of a right rather than a
sale or exchange.
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thing does "survive" the transfer to the hands of the transferee-cov-
enantee, because it is generally held that the covenant is assignable to
a future vendee."36
The main objection to this approach is that it ignores the nature
and function of a covenant not to compete and its interrelationship with
goodwill. In deciding whether a transaction produces capital or ordinary
income, the courts have not rigidly relied upon statutory definitions but
rather have probed the economic substance of the transaction and the
nature and function of the assets involved. For example, in Corn Products
Refining Co. 1 7 the Supreme Court held that trading in commodity
futures, normally a capital gain or loss transaction, produced ordinary
gains and losses when undertaken by a manufacturer of corn products
for the purpose of protecting his ordinary-income manufacturing opera-
tions. As previously contended, the preponderant purpose of a covenant
not to compete is to protect and assure the beneficial enjoyment of a
transferred capital asset-godwill. Another example of judicial probing
is in the "tie-in purchase" area. In a trend-setting Tax Court case,18 a a
liquor dealer, finding it difficult to obtain liquor under World War II
restrictions, bought stock in a distilling company and shortly thereafter
sold at a loss. The court held that the payments made for the stock less
the amount realized from its sale was in fact a part of the cost of the
liquor inventory acquired by the taxpayer. If the purchase of stok to
obtain inventory colors its capital-gain status, then perhaps the sale of
a covenant to effectuate the transfer of goodwill colors the covenant's
status.
The proponents of the ordinary-income approach to covenants not
to compete would reply by citing the much quoted maxim set forth in
the Corn Products opinion: "Since this section [1221] is an exception
from the normal tax requirements of the Internal Revenue Code, the
definition of a capital asset must be narrowly applied and its exclusions
interpreted broadly. This is necessary to effectuate the basic congres-
sional purpose." 39 However, the congressional purpose in enacting the
capital gain and loss provisions, 4' applies to a large extent to covenants
not to compete.
Capital gain provisions were first introduced into revenue legislation
in 1921, and though the legislative approach has been somewhat unclear
and inconsistent, early legislative history indicates two reasons for the
preferential treatment accorded capital gains: (1) passage of such a
provision will maximize mobility in investment capital and stimulate
profit-taking transactions which will increase revenues; (2) it is inequi-
136. 38 C.J.S. Good Will § 13 (1943).
137. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
138. Western Wine & Liquor Co., 18 T.C. 1090 (1952), acquiesced in, Rev. Rul. 58-40,
158-1 Cum. BULL. 275; 22 MERTENS 100 § 22.16.
139. 350 US. at 52.
140. See discussion at p. 17 supra.
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table to tax in full, in one year under progressive rates, appreciations
in value which have occurred over a period of years.'41 A strong argument
for taxing covenantors at capital gain rates is that this would encourage
more sellers to execute covenants, which would in turn maximize efficient
mobility in investment capital by protecting transfers of goodwill, a vital
component of capital. Furthermore, the value of a covenant, like good-
will, appreciates over a period of years as the seller builds up his com-
petitive position.
As previously noted,'42 the law seems to recognize a seller's right
to compete for future customers even after he has transferred goodwill,
and it is possible to imagine a situation where the only or major purpose
of a covenant is to eliminate competition for future customers rather
than to protect goodwill. However, if the courts were to recognize such
a covenant and treat it as producing ordinary income to the seller and
an amortization deduction to the buyer, they would be sanctioning and
encouraging covenants that are illegal and contrary to the spirit of
antitrust. 4
IV. CONCLUSION
In this writer's opinion, the soundest tax approach to covenants
not to compete, when they are sold with goodwill, would be to always
treat the proceeds from the sale of such covenants as part of the proceeds
from the sale of goodwill. This treatment follows from the conclusion
that the execution of a covenant not to compete is best characterized as
being merely incidental to, and subsumptive under the transfer of good-
will."'44 The covenant would thus always produce capital gain for the
seller and no amortization deduction for the buyer.14 5 There may be a
covenant the primary function of which is to eliminate competition for
future customers rather than to protect the goodwill of existing customers.
In such event, the legitimacy of the latter purpose might remove the
141. See Seidman, Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws (1938-1861) 813-15
(1938); S. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong., Ist Sess., 12 (1921).
142. See p. 18 supra.
143. See discussion, p. 3 supra.
144. See discussion, p. 19 supra.
145. Much has been said concerning the tax treatment of the seller (capital gain or
ordinary income), so it seems appropriate, in this final comment, to mention the situation
of the buyer. Some would say that the proposed rule would be unfair to the buyer by
depriving him of an amortization deduction. It seems, however, that amortization of a
covenant should not be allowed because, although it has a limited life, the expiration of its
term brings about no event which affects the business. The only event which did affect the
business transpired when the covenant was granted and an expectancy with an indeterminate
life passed to the buyer. The covenant is somewhat similar to a license for the operation
of a TV station or liquor store. Because such licenses are readily renewable by the holder,
the initial cost of obtaining them, as opposed to the normal periodic fees charged by the
issuer, is deemed to be paid for an asset with an indefinite life which is not the subject
of a depredation allowance. See Queenan, note 119 supra at p. 277. Furthermore, the loss
to the buyer of the amortization deduction could be compensated for by an adjustment in
the purchase price of the goodwill.
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covenant's taint of illegality and render it enforceable, and the proposed
rule would not fit such a covenant because of its hybrid nature; however,
a reading of the cases suggests that such covenants are very atypical.
On the one hand the proposed rule, unlike the "severability" and Daniel-
son tests, would recognize substance rather than form, and would con-
form to economic reality. Unlike the Wilson and "severability" ap-
proaches, on the other hand, it would eliminate subjectivity from the
judicial decision-making process and would provide tax certainty where
confusion now prevails. The proposed rule respects the spirit of anti-
trust in assuming that the purpose of a covenant is to protect goodwill
rather than to restrain trade, and it attempts to eliminate tax avoidance
by disregarding the parties' treatment of the transaction. Finally, the
rule would ease the administrative burden of the Commissioner in col-
lecting taxes, by obviating his need to litigate one party's claim without
any certainty that the result will be applied consistently to the other
party.
